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AN  EMPIRICAL STUDY' 
MARTIN WEITZMAN 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
U  TILITY analysis  is a highly theo- 
retical  construct  whose  main 
function in economic theory is to 
serve  as  a link  in  the  chain  connecting 
human preferences with economic behav- 
ior. That  few  aspects  of utility  analysis 
have  been  satisfactorily  subjected  to 
empirical  testing  is unfortunate  for eco- 
nomics  because  of  this  key  role  in  the 
theory  of demand. 
The  experiments  thus  far  performed 
have  primarily  involved  individuals  or 
small  groups  in  laboratory  situations. 
Ideally  a  utility  experiment  should  in- 
volve many participants  in a more or less 
natural  environment.  Of course it is dif- 
ficult  to  incorporate  these  features  into 
a  practical,  controlled,  experimental 
framework. 
In this paper the theory  and results of 
an altogether  different  approach  will  be 
presented.  Extensive  data  of  group  be- 
havior at a race track will provide the in- 
formation  for an analysis  of several utili- 
ty hypotheses.  In particular an "average 
man  at  the  race  track"  will  be  defined, 
his  underlying  decision-making  mecha- 
nism  investigated,  and  his  indifference 
map  between  various  risk combinations 
presented. His utility  of money curve will 
be  constructed  and  correlated  with  the 
theoretical  literature  on this  subject. 
1 Thanks are due to Professor Arnold Zellner who 
provided insight and encouragement. This work was 
done at the Social Systems Research Institute,  Uni- 
versity  of Wisconsin, and was supported in part by 
National  Science Foundation  Grant GS-151. 
II.  THE EXPECTED-UTILITY  HYPOTHESIS 
The theoretical  content  of utility  anal- 
ysis  has been amply  discussed  in the lit- 
erature.2 We shall make no reference here 
to  any  but  the  most  directly  relevant 
aspects. 
Each  person  is  assumed  to  possess  a 
subjective  preference pattern  among  al- 
ternative  situations.  Generally speaking, 
a  utility  function  is  any  function  that 
arithmetizes  the  relation  of  preference 
among  the  situations.3  When  risk is  in- 
volved,  each situation  is associated  with 
a probability  of occurrence. 
The  usefulness  of  the  utility  concept 
derives primarily from its behavioral  im- 
plications.  A  fundamental  postulate  as- 
serts that  each individual  acts  in such a 
manner that,  to a very good approxima- 
tion,  he is behaving  as if  he were maxi- 
2 R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and 
Decisions  (New  York:  John  Wiley  & Sons,  1958), 
chap.  ii  and  Appendix  1; Leonard  J.  Savage,  The 
Foundations of Statistics (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1954), chap. v; Jerome Rothenberg, The Meas- 
urement of Social  Welfare (Englewood  Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  1961), Part III; Armen Alchian, 
"The  Meaning  of Utility  Measurement,"  A merican 
Economic  Review,  XLIII  (March,  1953),  26-50; 
Daniel  Ellsberg,  "Classic  and  Current  Notions  of 
Measurable  Utility,"  Economic  Journal,  LXIV 
(September,  1954), 528-56. 
3 In  this paper I am avoiding  the issue between 
utility  as a measure of preference order  versus utility 
as  a  measure  of  preference  intensity.  Some  strict 
operationalists  (notably Ellsberg, op. cit.) regard the 
two concepts of utility  as quite disjoint. Rothenberg 
(op. cit., pp. 211-17)  argues cogently  for a high de- 
gree  of  likeness.  A  good  discussion  is  available  in 
Milton  Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Expected 
Utility  Hypothesis  and  the  Measurability  of  Util- 
ity,"  Journal of Political  Economy, LX  (December, 
1952), 463-74. 
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mizing his utility  function  over the rele- 
vant  range of action  states. 
The  personal  utility  of the  risk situa- 
tion  consisting  of the possibility  of win- 
ning m dollars with probability  p will be 
denoted  U(p,  m), where  U is some func- 
tion  of p and m. In writing  an individu- 
al's utility  as a function  of p and m alone 
I am abstracting from the influence of all 
other possible variables.  Changes in these 
other factors might shift the utility  func- 
tion over time, but for any specified time 
we may abstract  away  their influence as 
being  of  fixed  quality  while  the  afore- 
mentioned  two  determinants  serve  as 
variables. 
The  expected-utility  hypothesis  im- 
plies, among other things,  that  a modifi- 
cation  on  the  structure  of  the  utility 
function  for a risk situation  can be made 
of  the  form  U(p,  mn)  =  pui(m),  where 
u(m)  is the personal utility  of the money 
prize,  m  dollars.4 The  principle  of maxi- 
mization  of  U(p,  in)  now becomes  maxi- 
mization  of  the  expected  utility  pu(m).5 
Friedman and Savage were the first to 
construct  a hypothesis  that  explained  in 
a quantitative  way  the  risk behavior  of 
low-income  consumer units.6 Their  utili- 
4 We are not  concerned here with  the Von Neu- 
mann-Morgenstern  axiomatic  system  underlying 
this hypothesis,  but only with  the behavioral calcu- 
lus which it implies. 
5 To  be  more precise,  the  maximization  of  ex- 
pected utility  (EU)  hypothesis  asserts that  an indi- 
vidual  maximizes  pu(x),  where  p  is  the  objective 
probability.  The  maximization  of  subjectively  ex- 
pected utility  (SEU)  hypothesis  holds that  an indi- 
vidual maximizes p*- u(x), where p* is that person's 
subjective  probability.  Strictly  speaking,  it  is  the 
content of the EU hypothesis  that will be empirical- 
ly investigated  in this paper. Insofar as the audience 
evaluates p* close to p, the EU and SEU hypotheses 
will predict almost  identical  behavior  and,  to  that 
extent,  will be operationally  indistinguishable.  The 
role of subjective  probability  is an important  issue 
and shelving it at this point does not imply that it is 
irrelevant, but only that it is difficult to incorporate 
into this study. 
ty  of money  curve  contained  sections  of 
differing  curvature  which  corresponded 
to qualitatively  different economic levels. 
As a result of this construction,  they were 
able  to  account  for such  seemingly  con- 
tradictory  attitudes  toward  risk  as  the 
simultaneous  taking  of  insurance  and 
participation  in gambling. 
Markowitz  showed that the Friedman- 
Savage  hypothesis  contained  certain  ir- 
regularities,  and  presented  his  own 
amended  version.7 This  utility  function 
has no absolute  domain, but is defined at 
Utility  Cu) 
-m  a  Money Cm) 
-u 
FIG.  1 
any  given  time  only  with  respect  to  an 
individual's  "customary"  or  "present" 
wealth.  Figure  1 portrays  Markowitz's 
amended  function.  The  origin, x?, is not 
zero income but present or customary  in- 
come, and is also a point of inflection. To 
the  right  of x,  (which  region  this study 
will cover),  the curve is concave  upward 
(increasing marginal utility),  until  a sec- 
ond point of inflection, a, is reached. From 
then  on,  increasing  values  of  m yield 
6 Milton  Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The  Util- 
ity  Analysis of Choices Involving  Risk," Journal of 
Political  Economy, LVI  (August,  1948), 279-304. 
Harry  Markowitz,  "The  Utility  of  Wealth," 
Journal  of  Political  Economy,  LX  (April,  1952), 
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decreasing marginal  utility  (the  curve  is 
convex  upward).  The  exact location  of a 
would  depend  on  the  individual's  atti- 
tude  toward  risk.  People  who  are  less 
averse  to bearing risk over a wide range 
(for example, gamblers) would be expect- 
ed  to  possess  a  utility  function  with  a 
located  further to the right. 
Markowitz  uses his utility  function  as 
a device  to explain and predict  reactions 
toward  risk.  The  shape  of  this  utility 
function  is  consistent  with  many  em- 
pirical generalizations  about  risk behav- 
ior. We  shall see that  the  results  of this 
study bear out Markowitz's  construct for 
at least  one section  of his curve. 
III.  EXPERIMENTAL  BACKGROUND:  THE 
RACE  TRACK  AND  PARIMUTUEL  BETTING 
Racing  results  at four New  York race 
tracks  (Aqueduct,  Belmont,  Jamaica, 
and  Saratoga)  were studied  for the  ten- 
year  period  1954-63.  During  the  racing 
season activity  rotates  among these  four 
tracks so that at any given time only one 
is  being  used.  Nine  races  are  run  each 
day,  Monday  through  Saturday,  and on 
the  average  nine  horses  are  entered  in 
each  race,  although  the  number  may 
vary from four to fourteen.  Results  were 
obtained  from May  through  October  of 
each year so that  during the ten-year pe- 
riod over  12,000 races and  over  110,000 
performances were investigated. 
It  is essential  for a comprehension  of 
the theory underlying this study  that the 
reader  understand  fully  the  process  of 
parimutuel  betting.  This  system  of gam- 
bling is unique in that the odds are deter- 
mined  by  the  aggregate  wagering  pat- 
terns of the crowd itself, rather than fixed 
beforehand.  All  the  money  bet  on  pro- 
spective  winners  of a race  is  pooled.  A 
fixed  percentage  (the  "take")  is  sub- 
tracted as revenue for the track and state 
government.  Those  people  who hold the 
winning tickets receive the rest. The odds 
on any  horse are computed  by  subtract- 
ing  the  sum  bet  on  the  horse  from  the 
pool  after take  and dividing  by  the  sum 
bet on the horse. For each dollar bet, the 
amount  of money  actually  returned  (the 
"return")  is  the  odds  plus  one,  the  one 
being the  dollar bet. 
A  totalizer  (centrally  located  score- 
board)  summarizes  the  results  of previ- 
ous betting  by running the  current odds 
continuously  as bets pour in for a period 
of  about  twenty  minutes  before  each 
race. 
A rational person wagering at the race 
track  selects  a  particular  horse  to  win 
because  he  thinks  that  in  some  sense, 
considering  his personal attitude  toward 
risk, the horse is more of a "winner" than 
the  odds at which  he is being portrayed 
would seem to say. The race-track crowd 
is  a group  of people,  each  following  his 
own  personal  motives  and  preferences, 
who collectively  arrive via a market type 
of  mechanism  at  the  return  which  each 
horse pays.  In this  study  we shall be in- 
terested  in  the  general  relationship  be- 
tween  the  return  and  the  frequency  of 
winning.  The  reason for the  existence  of 
this  general  relationship,  as  contrasted 
with  the rationale  behind any given  bet- 
tor's specific choice,  will be explained  in 
terms  of utility  effects  operating  on  the 
different  amounts  of money  to  be won.8 
IV.  THE  EXPERIMENTAL 
PROBABILITY  CURVE 
It  was  found  experimentally  that  the 
probability  of a horse's victory  could be 
8 It is possible that  effects other than utility  are 
operating. However, it is not at all clear what these 
other effects might be, nor does it seem, on the face 
of it,  that  a strong a priori case could be made for 
their relevance. In the absence of such knowledge we 
are  forced  to  perform  the  obvious  abstraction.  If 
dynamic effects are operating, this analysis squeezes 
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expressed as a smooth and sharply deter- 
mined  function  of  the  return  which  it 
paid.9 
After  the  data  from  all  of  the  races 
were collected,  each  horse was  classified 
according  to  the  return  to  the  dollar  it 
would have paid had it won and subclas- 
sified within that category  as a winner or 
a loser (values of return are figured to the 
nearest $0.05 at the track).  An empirical 
probability  of winning-the  ratio  of the 
number of victories  divided  by the num- 
ber of entries-was  then  associated  with 
each value  of return. Weighted  aggrega- 
tion  performed on this  data  yielded  257 
separate points  of the form (x, p), where 
x is the value of return to the dollar and 
p is the  empirical probability  of victory 
associated  with  that  return. 
The  257  points,  themselves  derived 
from  over  110,000  runnings,  were fitted 
to a curve  (shown in Fig.  2) by  employ- 
ing a weighted  least-squares method  that 
corrected for heteroscedasticity.  Various 
functional  forms were tested  in an effort 
to ascertain  the underlying  "true" func- 
tion.  The  rectangular  hyperbola,  p= 
A/x,  yielded  fair results.'0 
The  most  appropriate  function  was 
judged  to be the  "corrected"  hyperbolic 
form," 
p  A+  Blog(1+x) 
x  x 
9 The  reader may  be  confused  at  this  point  by 
usage of the word "function."  It is being employed 
here in its strict mathematical sense; a functionf  of a 
variable x is a unique association  of a number f(x) 
with each number x in the domain of definition. No 
causality in the physical sense is meant to be implied 
by  this  definition. Thus  it  is not  being  maintained 
that  the crowd-determined return causes the objec- 
tive probability  of a horse's victory-more  likely it 
is the other way around and the crowd's estimation 
of the horse's probability of victory  sets the return. 
The existence of probability  as a function  of return 
in the mathematical,  not  the causal, sense is under 
investigation. 
It  was not  understood  why  this particu- 
lar function  yielded  more suitable results 
than  others,  but  its  superiority  was  evi- 
dent.  Neither  did complicated  combina- 
tions  of other functions  (including  poly- 
nomials)  make  a better  fit,  nor  did  the 
addition  of  extra  terms  to  this  function 
significantly  improve  matters;  further- 
more,  their  addition  could  not  be  justi- 
fied statistically.' 
There was no trend to the residuals of 
the  "corrected"  hyperbola;  they  were 
distributed  in  a  random  fashion  about 
their  origin.'8 This  also  testifies  to  the 
fact  that  the  underlying  equilibrium 
curve  is an appropriate  fit.  The  evident 
conclusion  is  that  in  the  empirical  data 
there  exists  a pattern  which  appears  to 
have  a  high  degree  of  coherence,  and 
which  is  aptly  described  by  the  chosen 
functional  form. 
10 The  weighted  least-squares  procedure yielded 
A5i  0.8545  - 
(0.0075)  xi 
with R2 =  0.9807. The coefficient estimate is several 
times  its  standard  error, and  the  coefficient of  de- 
termination  is  significantly  large.  However,  the 
residuals were successively  correlated, indicating  a 
systematic  trend for the error term. 
11  The weighted least-squares procedure yielded 
A X  1.00  1  1-  0.08  7  og ( 1+  xi) 
(0.0190)  X  (0.0099)  xi 
with  R2=  0.9852.  Both  coefficient  estimates  are 
several  times  their  standard  errors,  and  the  co- 
efficient of determination is unusually large. 
12 That  is,  the  low  values  computed  for their  t- 
statistics  did not  allow  rejection  of  the  hypothesis 
that  the added coefficients were zero. 
13  The  Durbin-Watson  d-statistic  was  1.94. This 
indicates  that  the  null hypothesis  of residual inde- 
pendence could be upheld against the alternative hy- 
pothesis  of positively  correlated successive disturb- 
ances at both the  1 and 5 per cent levels  (H. Theil 
and A. L. Nagar, "Testing the Independence of Re- 
gression Disturbances," Journal of the A merican Sta- 
tistical Association, LVI [December, 1951], 793-806). 22  MARTIN  WEITZMAN 
V.  FORMULATION OF THE  MODEL 
MR.  AVMART 
The  study  described  in  this  paper 
deals with  the group behavior  of racing 
devotees  in the face of uncertainty.  Any 
conclusions relate, strictly  speaking, only 
to the actions  of the assemblage  and not 
necessarily to the conduct of any member 
of  it.  In  order  to  create  a  convenient 
mode of expression we will make the pop- 
ulation  homogeneous  and  then  inquire 
what  attitudes  toward  risk  each  hypo- 
thetical  member  would  be  required  to 
possess  and what  actions  he would  have 
to  perform in  order to  explain  the  data 
which  were  obtained.  To  avoid  redun- 
dantly  using  a  lengthy  descriptive 
phrase, we will call a member of the arti- 
ficially constructed  "homogeneous"  race- 
track  crowd  Mr.  Avmart  (average  man 
at the race track). 
Mr.  Avmart's  wagers  are  allocated 
among  the  entrants  in a race in exactly 
the  same proportion  as the  entire crowd 
apportions  its money  among the various 
horses.  Of course,  no  real person  at  the 
track  distributes  his  bets  over  a  con- 
tinuous spectrum of values in the manner 
prescribed above.'4 
Mr.  Avmart  bets  a  total  of  exactly 
$5.00  in  each  race.  This  figure  is  very 
close to  the amount  averaged  per bettor 
for individual  wagers  placed  in  the  win 
pool  in  the  four  race  tracks  surveyed. 
The  exact  value  is  not  important,  since 
it is used only in constructing  a determi- 
14 Actually it is preferable for conceptual reasons 
to think of Avmart as using a randomizing device to 
select  the  horse he  bets  on.  The  outcomes  of  this 
randomizing device  are bets  on  the  various horses 
and the probabilities of  these outcomes are propor- 
tional to the amount the crowd has wagered on that 
horse. In this manner Avmart bets on only one horse 
per race,  the  probability  of  betting  on  that  horse 
being proportional to the aggregate amount wagered 
on that horse. The long-run effects are the same as if 
he distributed bets continuously for each race in the 
manner prescribed above. 
nate  scale for Avmart's  utility  of money 
curve and does not alter the shape of the 
curve.  In  that  capacity  $5.00  is  the 
closest  round figure, and a good enough 
approximation  to the true social average. 
The  question  of  Mr.  Avmart's  exist- 
ence  is  a  pertinent  issue.  In  the  literal 
sense,  of course, he is a completely  ficti- 
tious entity,  being nothing  more than an 
anthropomorphic  version of a race-track 
crowd. 
As will be shown, by postulating  a cer- 
tain very precise utility  curve for Avmart 
and  aggregating  him  into  a  race-track 
crowd,  the  risk  behavior  of  that  crowd 
will  be  explained.  The  race-track  crowd 
behaves  as if it were a homogeneous  con- 
glomeration  of  a  certain  individual, 
namely,  Avmart. 
To  a psychologist  concerned with  ex- 
istence and reality on an individual  level, 
this  formulation  of  Avmart  might  be 
quite  disquieting.  But  to  an  economist, 
interested  in utility  theory  primarily for 
its implications  in market behavior,  atti- 
tudes  toward risk, and the theory  of de- 
mand,  this  operational  definition  of Av- 
mart should coincide with  that  aspect  of 
human  behavior  in  which  he  is  profes- 
sionally  interested-namely,  a  personal 
component  of  social  behavior  which 
when performed collectively  by individu- 
als, yields  the  true group action. 
VI.  AVMART S INDIFFERENCE  CURVE 
We come now to a key theoretical deri- 
vation.  The empirically acquired curve of 
Figure  2  with  the  scale  of  the  x-axis 
blown up fivefold represents Avmart's in- 
difference map between  various risk situ- 
ations  involving  money  prizes and prob- 
abilities.  But  before  this  can  be  shown, 
Avmart  must be more fully  explained. 
Mr. Avmart  was constructed  with  the 
idea  of a social average in mind.  He  was 
made to be the "most typical bettor."  Of UTILITY  ANALYSIS  AND  GROUP BEHAVIOR  23 
course,  when  he  was  so  constructed  he 
ceased  to  exist  in  the  strict  sense,  but 
that  conclusion would hold in any  social 
averaging situation. 
So far, however, nothing has been said 
about  Avmart's  motivation.  Let  us  mo- 
tivate  him the way we assume any bettor 
at the track is motivated:  to make those 
(p)  Probability 
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FIG.  2.-The  theoretical probability curve 
wagers  he  believes  are  maximizing  his 
utility  function.  Avmart,  average  bettor 
that  he is,  apportions  his $5.00  per race 
exactly  as the entire crowd is apportion- 
ing its total money. But Avmart does not 
consciously  or  unconsciously  set  out  to 
act  in this  manner.  Being  an individual 
in  a  risk  situation,  we  are  postulating 
that  his  behavior  can  be  described  as 
maximization  of personal utility. 
Suppose  Figure  2 were  (hypothetical- 
ly)  reproduced  as  Figure  2',  where  the 
two are identical  except  that  the scale of 
the x-axis of the former is magnified five- 
fold  and  now  called  the  m(money)  axis. 
The curve of Figure 2' is one of Avmart's 
utility  isoquants. 
Consider any  two  points  A and B  on 
the  curve  of  Figure  2'.  A  is  the  point 
(ml,  pi) representing  the possibility  that 
Avmart  will  win  ml dollars with  proba- 
bility pi, while B is the point  (M2,  p2)  rep- 
resenting  his  possibility  of  winning  Mi2 
dollars  with  probability  P2.15 Suppose 
Avmart  "prefers" A  to B.  Since he bets 
15 This option is never presented to anyone at the 
race track in so clear a fashion. No real bettor pur- 
chases a "possibility of winning m dollars with prob- 
ability  p"; but whenever he picks the horse paying 
m dollars the results of this study  show that  in the 
long run he can expect the proportion of victories as- 
sociated with that horse to be p. In this manner we 
can  speak  of  Avmart  being  offered the  "package" 
(in,  p)-the  possibility  of  winning  in  dollars with 
probability  p.  Although,  of  course,  no  real  bettor 
ever thinks directly of a horse in such a general man- 
ner, it is precisely the existence of an underlying bias 
toward  or against  certain  "packages" in  which  we 
are interested. 24  MARTIN  WEITZMAN 
in  exactly  the  same  ratios  as the  racing 
populace,  A  is  socially  preferred  to  B. 
This means that  some of the money  that 
would have been bet on B will now move 
to A.  With  more money  being bet  on A, 
the return declines and that point  moves 
to  the left  while  B  shifts  to  the  right  as 
the  return on it  improves.  These  return 
movements  cause A  to  become  less  and 
B  more  desirable.  Eventually  an  equi- 
librium situation  is reached where A and 
B are of equal desirability.  But  the curve 
of Figure 2 (and hence of Fig. 2') is itself 
an equilibrium curve. Then A and B are 
of the  same utility  to Avmart,  and like- 
wise  for any  other pair of points  on the 
curve of Figure 2'-that  is, that  curve is 
one of his risk-indifference  contours.'6 
The  fact  that  the  rectangular  hyper- 
bola  was  a fairly  good  fit  to  the  experi- 
mental  probability  curve  is  significant. 
This  means  that  Avmart's  adherence  to 
the  expected  value hypothesis  (maximi- 
zation  of  expected  value),  which  would 
result  in  a  hyperbola  (mp =  constant) 
for his indifference contour, is not a com- 
pletely  inappropriate  description  of  his 
behavior. Stated more precisely, the risk- 
indifference  contour  which  would  result 
from the assumption  of maximization  of 
expected  value  is  a good  first-order  ap- 
16 Although  Avmart  is  indifferent  between  any 
two points of Figure 2', this does not mean that  he 
can  now  carelessly  place  bets  anywhere  on  that 
curve. Figure 2' is an indifference map given the pre- 
vailing  social  betting  patterns.  If  the  crowd  (Av- 
mart)  changes  betting  patterns,  then  Figure  2'  is 
altered. The situation  is made somewhat clearer by 
considering  (as we are assuming)  a crowd of many 
Avmarts,  each with  identical  utility  functions,  and 
each making one $5.00 bet. If the probability versus 
return  curve  deviates  momentarily  from  that  re- 
quired to  give  all bets  equal utility,  then  Avmarts 
will line up at the ticket window to drive the prob- 
ability versus return curve back to the proper shape. 
It is interesting to note that the existence of a "take" 
had no bearing on the interpretation of Figure 2' as 
Avmart's risk indifference curve. The relevant ques- 
tion is "given  the fact that  Avmart pays a 'fee' for 
the  pleasure of gambling,  which gambling  levels  or 
'packages' does he then prefer to bet on?" 
proximation  to  the  curve  actually  ob- 
tained.  However,  a  more  exact  fit  of  a 
slightly  different  form  could  be  statisti- 
cally  justified  with  a  high  level  of  con- 
fidence. 
VII.  AVMART S UTILITY  OF 
MONEY  CURVE 
By  assuming  that  Avmart  obeys  the 
expected  utility  hypothesis,  we  can  de- 
termine  his  utility  of  money  function 
exactly.  For every point  on Avmart's  in- 
difference map of Figure 2' the following 
equalities hold: U(p, m) =  pu(m) =  K, 
where  K  is  the  constant  utility  of  that 
curve.  Remembering  that  Figure  2' also 
yields  p  as  a  function  of  m,  p =  p(m) 
where  m =  5x,  we  have  that  K  = 
p(m)u(m),  or u(m)  =  Klp(m).  We shall 
make  u($5)  =  5 "utiles"  in  order to  fix 
the  utility  scale.  Then  K  is  equated  to 
5p($5),  where  p($5)  is  the  value  of  the 
Figure 2' function  for m =  $5. 
Figure 3 is the curve of u(m), Avmart's 
utility  of  money  function.  Several  fea- 
tures  are  noteworthy.  The  curve  itself 
exhibits  only  slight  curvature.  Derived 
as  it  is  from  the  theoretical  probability 
curve  of  Figure  2,  an extensive  amount 
of raw data stands behind it  (257 points, 
themselves  averages of over 110,000 run- 
nings). This permitted  an excellent deter- 
mination  of  the  theoretical  probability 
function which in turn was used to obtain 
the  mathematical  expression  for  the 
curve of Figure 3. These  aspects  of rela- 
tive  precision  stand  in  marked  contrast 
with  the  more  usual  indeterminate  na- 
ture  of  experimentally  derived  utility 
functions. 
Since the utility  function  was  derived 
in analytic  form, it was possible to obtain 
first  and  second  derivatives.17 The  first 
17 The calculations are not performed here. They 
are straightforward, but lengthy,  and the reader can 
easily verify the results which are cited. UTILITY  ANALYSIS  AND  GROUP BEHAVIOR  25 
derivative  is always  positive  for positive 
m. The  second derivative  is also positive 
for  all  positive  values  of  m,  but  ap- 
proaches  zero  very  rapidly  as  m  gets 
larger. At  m =  $500,  d2Xudm2 is already 
less  than  one  hundredth  of  its  value  at 
m =  $5.00. It is thus approaching a point 
of  inflection  as m becomes  larger, and it 
seems  not  implausible  to  suppose  that 
data  over a wider range would  show the 
eventual  attainment  of a point  of inflec- 
tion, and then a change in the sign of the 
second  derivative.  Because  this  curve 
was  obtained  only  for  values  of  m  be- 
tween  $5.00  and  $500.00,  the  status  of 
this  conjecture  unfortunately  could  not 
be tested,  and it also could not be ascer- 
tained  whether  or not  another  point  of 
inflection  lay  to  the left  of this  interval. 
However,  it  does  appear  that  the  range 
of m for which  Figure 3 has been drawn 
coincides  with  Markowitz's  range of in- 
creasing marginal utility  (xc <  m <  a in 
Fig.  1). This range was explicitly  created 
in order to explain gambling behavior on 
a theoretical  level.  It  is especially  large 
(u) utility in "utiles"  18 
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in  this  case  (a  >  $500.00)  because  Av- 
mart  represents  a  group  that  possesses 
greater  propensity  toward  risk-bearing. 
Because  only this interval was investi- 
gated,  the  results  do  not  constitute  a 
test  of  the  applicability  of  Markowitz's 
hypothesis  to  Avmart's  behavior  over 
the  entire range for which  it was formu- 
lated.  Nevertheless,  for the  range exam- 
ined, the results are completely  in accord 
with what  his theory  predicts.'8 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
A new approach to the empirical study 
of some facets  of utility  theory  has been 
explained and presented.  Instead  of con- 
centrating  on  individuals  and  trying  to 
derive  utility  generalizations  from  their 
experimental  behavior,  more  nearly  the 
18  A study  performed by  R.  M.  Griffith ("Odds 
Adjustments  by  American  Horse  Race  Betters," 
American Journal  of Psychology, LXII  [1949], 290) 
noted the existence of a systematic undervaluation of 
the chances of short-odded horses and overvaluation 
of long-odded  horses.  Griffith was  primarily  inter- 
ested in other matters,  but he noted  this quantita- 
tive trend as well as a rough qualitative  similarity in 
data from the years 1947 and 1934. This correlation 
appeared  strange  to  him,  since  one  year  was  a 
prosperous one,  and  the  other was  during the  De- 
pression. These  results are neatly  explained by  the 
utility  interpretation  outlined above. 
converse  approach  was  attempted.  A 
plethora  of  data  concerning  the  collec- 
tive  risk  actions  of  parimutuel  bettors 
was employed  in investigating  utility  as- 
pects  of  the  behavior  of  a hypothetical 
member  of  the  group.  Mr.  Avmart  was 
operationally  defined to be an "average" 
constituent  of  the  race-track  populace. 
One  of  Avmart's  indifference  contours 
among  risk  situations  was  shown.  As- 
suming  Avmart's  adherence  to  the  ex- 
pected  utility  hypothesis,  his  utility  of 
money curve was derived. This curve was 
strikingly  similar to the one proposed on 
theoretical  grounds by  Markowitz  as an 
amendment  to  the  Friedman-Savage 
hypothesis. 
The  conclusion  is not  that  human  be- 
ings  possess,  in  any  real  sense  of  that 
word,  a sharply  defined utility  function 
which  they  consult  when  making  deci- 
sions. Indeed,  to be of use in the context 
of economic theory it is sufficient only to 
believe  that in some appropriate statisti- 
cal  sense  people  behave  as  if  they  pos- 
sessed  such  a  function.  The  results  of 
this  study  show  that  the  crowd  at  the 
race track behaves as if it were composed 
of  a group  of individuals  each  of whom 
possesses  an identical  utility  function  of 
the Markowitz  variety. 